we describe computable general equilibrium (CGE) model equations that formalize the types of choices being made and discuss the regional economic impacts that can be simulated. In the process, we raise several related research questions. The goal of welfare reform is to decrease household dependency on transfer payments from government. States have been encouraged to tailor programs to their own circumstances two ways: by waivers (prior to 1996) and by the conversion of the previously "need-based" intergovernmental transfers to blocked grants (since 1996) . Waivers gave states the authority to administer their own programs, and blocking means they must do so with a limited budget. The requisite for federal funding under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 is that states require able-bodied welfare recipients to make the transition from welfare to work or risk losing benefits. It is also the first act since the original Social Security Act of 1935 to impose a time limit on dependency. Ideally, the reform encourages increased labor market participation by low income households. Other ways that households can become independent (without changing family composition) are via increased child support payments being sought and received by single parents, or by incurring debt.
Since the passing of the PRWORA, the USDA has been investigating the impact of devolution on the Food Stamp Program (FSP). A key question for the USDA is whether the fiscal burden on the food stamp program will increase as state assistance programs become more stringent (Kuhn, LeBlanc, and Gundersen (Keng, Garasky, and Jensen) . This suggests that it is easier to get (and stay) off welfare if one lives in a metro area in Iowa. Among economic and income variables, both wage income and child support had a positive and statistically significant effect on staying off of public assistance.
Nearly 90% of those leaving FIP and returning within six months received FSP benefits during the transition period. For these cases FSP was an alternative safety net. quarters of parents are employed after they leave the rolls (Parrott) . However, wages are typically below $8 per hour, and often below $6 per hour. As a result, earnings levels of exiters are still well below poverty. Recent national research also shows that the probability of successfully leaving public assistance varies with personal characteristics (education, job experience, age, ethnicity) and family composition (marital status, number of dependents) (cf., Moffit, Sandefur and Cook). 
Most of this interregional CGE model of
Iowa is described elsewhere (Kilkenny 1993, Kilkenny and Otto, Kilkenny 1999a) . In this paper we present new structural equations for modeling welfare and food stamp programs. The key behavioral hypothesis is that households will choose (a) whether or not to work, (b) to work locally or to commute, and (c) to participate in programs depending on which set offers the highest current disposable income (see also Keane and Moffitt).
Households are distinguished by family composition (married or single head, Each type of labor supplied by each household also chooses between working locally or commuting. This discrete choice problem is modeled using a modified Kuhn-Tucker condition for allow for corner solutions, in probability terms, benchmarked to base year obser- Earnings are endogenously determined with respect to occupation-specific labor demand by sectors across regions.
The CGE framework strength is that it highlights the circular flow of income from production (and/or transfers) to consumption, and back again. Another innovation in our state/substate CGE model for program evaluation concerns household expenditure: preferences are explicitly non-homothetic, and parameterization is not household-type specific. Engel's Law is the widely documented phenomenon that as income rises, the share of consumer expenditure on necessities falls, and the share spent on luxuries rises. For this model, we choose an approximation of the "almost ideal demand system" recommended by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) , called the Working-Leser demand model. and YDhh denotes the household's disposable income (gross of transfers and net of taxes and inter-household transfers). Figure 2 shows the Engel functions given preliminary estimates of oa and 3c using consumer expenditure survey data. Consumer expenditure survey data are well known to be problematic with respect to the measurement of household income and thus saving/dissaving.
The main pattern, however, is clear: when saving and contributions to social insurance are expenditure items, they are luxuries and other items are necessities.
Thus, this model will simulate a decrease (increase) in net saving as household incomes fall (rise). The formulation is an important point of departure for dynamic modeling of welfare reform. Also, while some lowincome households in dissaving mode are retirees, consuming out of their accumulated stock of wealth, others are accumulating debt.
Both types of dissaving, however, reduce the amount of loanable funds available for physical capital investment. Both affect the sectoral composition of aggregate demand, and thus regional employment.
Typical modeling of final demand in CGE models relies on budget shares that are specific to each household type, which do not change regardless of changes in the level of income of households in the type. This ex-ante rigidity is undesirable in a model in which the movement into/out of poverty is a key endogenous feature. It can lead to simulating larger and larger household indebtedness as households' incomes rise. In contrast, this model's demand parameters (a-and P) are not household-type specific. A single demand function can be used to generate unique household budget allocations for any endogenously determined income level. This makes it possible to disaggregate households according to criteria that, while very relevant to program participation and eligibility, are exogenous to the state of the economy.
Changes in the Economy or Programs
The CGE framework described above may be used evaluate a recession in the non-farm economy, coupled with a change in the state's budget. During a non-farm recession, the employment of some occupations will decline relatively more than others, given intra-and interstate labor mobility and the concomitant sticky wages. More metro as well as nonmetro households will become eligible for transfers. State tax revenues at the initial tax rates will decline.
Under the PRWORA, the state's receipt of intergovernmental transfers for TANF is fixed. Thus, during a recession the state must either raise taxes, reduce temporary assistance, or reallocate spending. The first strategy is progressive, the second is regressive, and the third is unpredictable. A progressive strategy will shift the composition of aggregate demand toward necessities; a regressive strategy will shift aggregate demand toward luxuries.
Shifts in the necessity/luxury composition of aggregate demand will have different sub-state effects. All types of places, rural, urban, and metro, offer necessities, bu all types of places offer luxuries. C Place Theory posits that goods and se produced at high economies of scale chased infrequently, or for which the th hold price is high, are generally only ava in metropolitan locations (see DiPa and Wheaton). These are called "Cen Places" in part because they serve customers from their surrounding non-metro areas. Metro areas will suffer more than proportionately from decreases in household incomes in the state, as spending decreases relatively on normal and luxury goods, compared to spending on necessities. These outcomes have been demonstrated using the Fiscal SAM developed for this CGE model (Kilkenny 1999b In the process of specifying the general equilibrium model we confronted a number of yet unanswered questions. Some must be answered before we can finish calibrating the CGE model described above. The answers to the other questions will likely inspire yet another level of analysis. To calibrate the existing model, we must delineate the labor markets areas within the state (using the BEA's Economic Areas, for example) and then measure potential commuting costs. We must document and calibrate regional purchase coefficients. We must also account for interregional flows of child support payments within and outside the state. We need to find better data on household income, expenditure, and (dis)saving, then estimate demand function parameters. And we must estimate the probabilities of the three discrete choice problems for households.
To proceed to the next level of analysis, we should also address the following questions. 
